In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the factors that motivated emerging economies to change their capital outflow controls in the recent decades. Liberalization of capital outflow controls can allow emerging market economies (EMEs) to reduce net capital inflow (NKI) pressures, but may cost their governments the fiscal revenues that external financial repression generates. Our results indicate that external repression revenues in EMEs declined substantially in the 2000's compared with the 1980's. In line with this decline in external repression revenues and their growth accelerations in 2000's, concerns related to net capital inflows took predominance over fiscal concerns in the decisions to liberalize capital outflow controls. Emerging markets facing high volatility in net capital inflows and higher balance sheet exposures liberalized outflows less. Countries eased outflows more in response to higher net capital inflows, higher appreciation pressures in the exchange market, higher real exchange rate volatility and greater accumulation of reserves.
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I. Introduction
Recent years have seen a re-emergence of the policy debate on the appropriateness of capital controls. Opponents of capital controls argue that these controls can lead to local and global misallocation of resources, perpetuate global imbalances (by allowing countries to maintain undervalued real exchange rates) and encourage corruption. Further, opponents of capital controls argue that in the empirical literature these controls have been found to be of limited effectiveness in stemming net capital inflows (NKI). Proponents of capital controls have argued that capital controls are macro-prudential measures and an optimal response to distortions in financial markets (for example herd behaviour, too-big-to-fail, etc.). These controls are deemed to be an important tool to prevent the build-up of financial sector risks and to reduce the damage associated with sudden stops. 2 Adding fuel to the debate, the IMF has softened its longstanding opposition to capital controls, and now suggests that such controls may be a valid tool of macroeconomic and macroprudential management when other tools have been exhausted (IMF, 2011a) .
The debate on what emerging market economies (EMEs) should or should not do has two key missing elements. The first is a fact-based analysis of the macroeconomic and financial pressures that EME policymakers most often respond to when imposing capital controls. The empirical literature assessing emerging market motivations for capital controls is scant. 3 The second missing element in the debate is a discussion of the use of capital outflow controls as a potential response to NKI pressures. Most of the recent policy debate has focused on tightening of capital inflow controls in response to surges in net capital inflows. 4 However, because NKI are the difference between capital inflows and outflows, countries that have existing outflow controls have another potential tool to reduce NKI -the liberalization of outflows. 5 This tool was discussed in the literature on managing capital flows of the 1990's (see Laban and Larrain, 1997) , but it has been missing from the recent debate. Recent research in documents that in 22 EMEs between 2004 and the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, outflow controls were liberalized more frequently than inflow controls were tightened. The pre-2008 crisis period saw a surge in net capital inflows to EMEs of a magnitude comparable to the post-2 South Korea's "President Lee Myung-Bak, in an interview with the Financial Times published on Oct. 29, said any measures that a country may take to smooth cross-border capital flows should not be interpreted as capital controls but 'macro-prudential policies'." Factbox -South Korean Policymakers' remarks on capital controls, Reuters, 12 November, 2010. 3 Recent work by Fratzscher (2012) examines this question for overall capital account openness in a broad sample of emerging and advanced economies over the period . He finds that foreign exchange policy objective and overheating concerns have been the two main motives for capital controls, particularly since 2000. 4 See, for example, Ostry et. al. (2011) , Klein (2012) , Hutchison et. al. (2012) , Patnaik and Shah (2012) and Warnock (2011) . 5 NKI are measured as the difference between inflows by non-residents and net outflows by residents. Therefore both lower net inflows by non-residents and higher net outflows by residents would lead to a decline in NKI.
2 2008 crisis surge, yet inflow tightening measures became a primary tool of restricting NKI only after the crisis.
The use of outflow liberalization in NKI management policy can be constrained by the fact that outflow controls exist not only for reasons of managing capital flows but also to keep the government's borrowing costs low by keeping domestic savings at home. Sustained outflow controls often form a part of a web of regulations on the domestic financial sector (for example, interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements, directed lending, etc.) that constitute "financial repression". These regulations seek to further reduce the cost of government borrowing and to allocate savings to preferred sectors. Capital outflow controls help prevent capital flight in response to domestic regulations, and therefore are a key ingredient of financial repression. The revenues from financial repression can be substantial. Giovannini and de Melo (1993) showed that for some 24 emerging and developing economies over the period 1972-87, revenues from external repression averaged 1.4% of GDP. These considerations suggest that the decision to liberalize outflow controls in response to surging inflows could involve weighing the benefits of reduced NKI against the loss of revenues from financial repression.
In this paper, we provide evidence on EME motivations for capital outflow policy by examining fiscal and macroeconomic factors at the time when outflow controls were liberalized. We address the two gaps in literature identified above by focussing on capital outflow controls and by providing a positive analysis of outflow policy changes. To accomplish this, we build two novel datasets. First, we extend the dataset presented in to cover the period 2001-2010. This dataset comprises all changes in capital account regulations in 22 large EMEs and therefore provides a de-jure assessment of capital controls. 6 Second, we estimate the revenue from external financial repression which, following Giovannini and de Melo (1993) , is defined as the fiscal revenue obtained by preventing residents from freely investing abroad. It is measured as the difference between (effective or ex-post) external and domestic interest rate on government debt, times the government's domestic debt.
Our updated Giovannini and de Melo measure of external repression revenues is available for 15 countries. 7 We find that in contrast to the 1980's, when many EMEs were found to be earning significant revenues from external repression, EMEs in the most recent decade earned negative (and statically insignificant) revenues from external repression on average. The negative revenues mean that EME governments faced lower borrowing costs in foreign markets (even after accounting for costs imposed by exchange rate fluctuations) than in the domestic market. The decline in external repression revenues has occurred despite the fact that emerging economies continue to maintain significant restrictions on capital outflows (notwithstanding the liberalizations over time).
There are several interpretations of the negative external repression revenues found in our study. An EME government with positive revenues from repression may be reluctant to liberalize outflows to manage the concerns posed by surging NKI for fear of losing these revenues, but may find it easier to liberalize when there are no revenues to be lost. In fact, EMEs did liberalize outflow policy substantially in the 2000's. Most of the outflow liberalizations took place in the years of surging NKI (putting downward pressure on domestic interest rates) and rapid economic growth (leading to increasing fiscal revenues from other sources), which suggests that fiscal concerns did not pose a binding constraint for EMEs in this period. Another interpretation of the negative external repression revenues is that, while many of these EMEs could have borrowed even more in markets abroad in the last decade, they refrained from doing so. That they chose not to borrow more abroad even at favorable interest rates may reflect concerns about greater balance sheet exposure (as most can borrow only in hard currencies) and the fear of a sudden stop. Finally, emerging markets may be willing to temporarily accept negative repression revenues to preserve the future repression tax base.
The result that concerns related to net capital inflows took predominance over fiscal concerns in the decision to liberalize capital outflow controls in the 2000's finds further support in our empirical exercise. EMEs liberalized outflow controls less when facing greater NKI volatility and higher short term balance sheet exposure, while they eased more when NKI, real exchange rate appreciation pressures, reserves accumulation were high -all pointing to concerns about foreign exchange valuation and domestic overheating concerns. Unlike the 1980's, we find very limited importance of fiscal variables in explaining liberalization of capital outflow controlsonly in the samples of relatively closed and non-inflation targeting countries, do we see a negative association of greater external repression revenues with easing of outflows. This lack of association is consistent with the decline in repression revenues for EMEs in the 2000's. This decade saw the growth accelerations of emerging markets, which led to a decline in their risk premia. The 2000's were also a decade of few adverse external shocks, real exchange rate appreciation pressures in EMEs and overall improved stances of their fiscal policies. 8 Revenues from repression therefore became less important in the decision to liberalize outflows.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we elaborate on the potential motivations for imposing capital outflow controls. Section III describes the construction of and trends in one of the main data series compiled in the paper -the changes in capital outflow controls. We devote section IV to describing the measures used to capture fiscal concerns, including the second main data series compiled in the paper -revenues from external repression. Section V 4 identifies testable hypotheses and outlines the econometric methodology. Section VI presents the results and section VII concludes.
II. Potential motivations for capital outflow controls
Many motivations have been advanced in the literature for imposing or liberalizing controls on outflows. 9 Capital outflow controls have often been imposed, at least temporarily, in response to a run on the currency or inflation, sovereign debt and financial crises. However, outside of crisis periods, one of the principal motivations for sustaining capital outflow controls is that these controls allow governments to lower the domestic cost of borrowing for themselves and for their preferred sectors by keeping domestic savings at home. Further, controls on outflows facilitate the use of other measures constituting financial repression such as interest rate ceilings, high reserves requirements etc., by preventing capital flight in response to these restrictions. This allows governments to further depress their borrowing costs. Giovannini and de Melo (1993) showed that when countries faced constraints on their ability to raise revenue through taxes, financial repression could be the optimal choice. They also showed that for some 24 emerging and developing economies over the period 1972-87, revenues from external repression averaged about 9 percent of total government revenue from taxes. The large magnitude of the revenues earned from maintaining outflow controls posed potentially a major constraint towards liberalizations of the capital account. Outflow controls can also help governments maximize the inflation tax by limiting the ability of residents to shift to foreign assets. 10 Aizenman and Guidotti (1994) also argued that capital controls may be desirable in developing countries when collection costs associated with taxes (other than the inflation tax) are high.
Empirical work in the 1990's underscored the importance of fiscal policy as a motivation for imposing capital controls. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) found that capital controls were associated with a higher ratio of government consumption to GDP, higher government revenues from seigniorage and lower real interest rates. Alesina et. al. (1994) found that maintaining capital controls led to lower stock of government debt (presumably through lower debt service costs) and that countries with weaker central banks (and therefore lower resistance to use of inflation tax) were more likely to be using capital controls. Recent work by also suggests that financial repression played an important role in the rapid reduction of public debts in advanced economies in the Bretton Woods era.
For countries that have legacy capital outflow controls (as was true for many emerging economies entering into the new millennium), the decision on whether and when to liberalize 5 these controls can be constrained by fiscal reasons discussed above or by exogenous political factors, but can also be motivated by economic pressures. In particular, liberalization of capital controls can be motivated by their use as tools for managing macroeconomic and financial pressures arising from the size and volatility of net capital inflows. In periods of surges in net capital inflows, policymakers may choose to either tighten controls on inflows or to liberalize controls on outflows in order to reduce the size and volatility of net capital inflows. The various concerns arising from rapid increases in NKI can be grouped into 4 main categories:
1. Concerns about overheating: Net capital inflows to emerging markets are often procyclical, increasing when the economies are booming and retreating when the economies are slowing (Kaminsky et. al., 2005) . Surging capital inflows in periods of high economic growth can therefore lead to overheating concerns by further boosting growth, domestic credit expansion, and inflationary pressures.
2.
Concerns about foreign exchange valuation: Net capital inflow surges can lead to overvaluation of the exchange rate, thus hurting export competitiveness.
3.
Concerns about financial stability: NKI surges can exacerbate asset price booms in real estate or financial markets and aggregate balance sheet exposures, thus giving rise to financial stability concerns.
4.
Concerns about macroeconomic volatility: The booms and busts in non-resident's inflows can be an independent source of macroeconomic volatility and can exacerbate existing cycles.
Liberalizing capital outflow controls can address these concerns by opening up a window for greater outflows, thus reducing the net capital inflows during boom times. Analogously, tightening of capital outflow controls can prevent capital flights in poor times. In addition, having resident investments abroad that can be liquidated and brought home at times of slowing economic growth can counter stops in inflows by non-residents, thus reducing overall volatility of net capital inflows. This channel has been shown to be historically important in mitigating the volatility of net capital inflows in high income economies in recent studies of gross capital flows (Broner et. al. 2011; IMF 2011b) .
In this paper, we test the relative importance of the concerns described above, for 18 large emerging economies, over the period 2001-2010. The testable hypotheses associated with each are described in section V. The next section describes the evolution of capital controls in the last decade in these emerging markets.
III. Evolution of capital controls policy in 2000's
In order to analyze the motivation for liberalizing capital outflows, we use a unique dataset that contains changes in capital account regulation for 22 major EMEs between 2001 and 2010. This 6 dataset is an expanded version of the data used in .The main source of data is IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The AREAER provides information on member countries' exchange arrangements, exchange and trade restrictions and capital transactions. We focus on the capital transactions section which includes relevant regulations applicable to the financial sector. AREAER information is supplemented with information on similar measures from central banks' and other country regulators' websites, news sources, as well as other research papers. 11
The dataset provides information on the changes in capital controls, by date of effectiveness. We classify each change as representing an inflow or outflow control, an easing or a tightening of policy and then count the number of inflow easings, inflow tightenings, outflow easings and outflow tightenings per quarter.
Our strategy of counting the number of measures is in line with the existing de-jure measures of capital controls which measure tightness of capital controls by summing (or using the principal components of) dummies that indicate the existence of regulations under broad categories of transactions (Edwards, 2007; Chinn-Ito, 2008; Schindler, 2009 ). However, it goes further and adds information in one or more dimensions to what is available in the existing indices: (i) the changes taking place within the broad categories considered by the indices 12 and (ii) the changes in capital controls applicable to inflows or outflows. The existing indices miss one or both dimensions. For example, of all the indices for which data is available for at least part of the 2000's, Schindler (2009 ), Chinn-Ito (2008 do not take into account changes in restrictiveness of controls. Further, the Chinn-Ito (2008) and Edwards (2007) indices do not distinguish between restrictions on inflows and outflows. 13 The dataset used in this paper provides information both on the changes in controls under each category of transactions as well as on whether the restrictions relate to inflows (by non-residents) or outflows (by residents). 14 The main demerit of this method of analysis is that the number of measures per se does not allow us to judge the impact of the measures (eg: in terms of volume of transactions it influences) or to differentiate the changes by their magnitude, which varies between countries. However, most measures in the database are of relatively homogeneous magnitude, and therefore we think our 11 Further information on the dataset is provided in Appendix A. 12 The dataset categorizes changes as belonging to restrictions under 8 the subcategories of capital transactions (for example, controls on capital and money market instruments, controls on direct investment, etc.), as described in the Appendix. If a major policy announcement includes several changes, each regarding a different category of transaction, each of these changes is counted individually. For example, on 14 March 2005, Brazil introduced three different changes -an elimination of the limit on investment in shares of the main company by employees of firms belonging to foreign groups; an elimination of the limit on remittances for outward FDI by non-financial private enterprises; and a removal of the authorization requirement for guarantees by non-financial judicial persons in credit operations for their foreign subsidiaries. Each of these changes is counted individually in our database. 13 Schindler (2009) index provides information on controls under different subcategories of transactions, for inflows and outflows separately, but the dataset only covers the period 1995-2005. 14 However, our dataset does not allow a cross-country comparison of the existing level of de-jure controls, unlike the other indices. approach does provide useful information about the overall direction of policy, and about the attempts to liberalize or to close the capital account. 15 The countries in the database include the 21 emerging markets that are in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index and Argentina. However, for the purpose of this paper, we drop the 3 eastern European countries, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, as their capital account liberalizations were determined by their EU accessions (rather than by any economic pressures). We also drop changes in Argentina before 2003, in order to include in the sample only relatively homogeneous or marginal changes in policy. We also drop Turkey before 202Q2, to exclude its currency and inflation crisis period.
The emerging markets in the sample changed their capital controls 664 times between 2001 and 2010. Capital outflows controls saw 302 changes and of these the majority, or 274 changes were easing of restrictions on outflows. There were 362 changes in inflow controls, out of which a minority (135) were tightening of inflows. Outflow liberalizations were far more common than inflow tightenings in the sample.
Since countries could be easing and tightening restrictions on outflows (inflows) in the same quarter, to gauge the overall direction of policy, we computed the following measures:
1. Net Easings of Outflows: This measure is the difference between the number of outflows easing measures and the number of outflows tightening measures in each quarter. We use this as our main dependent variable in this paper. 2. Net Tightening of Inflows: This measure is the difference between the number of inflow tightening measures and the number of inflow easing measures in each quarter.
Further, since both outflows easings as well as inflows tightenings would tend to reduce the pressure of net capital inflows, we group the measures into whether the measures would encourage or discourage NKI, i.e. the difference between inflows and outflows, as in . This gives us the following additional categories: Figure 1 shows that net NKI restricting measures peaked in 2007 and again in 2010, both peak years for net capital inflows pressures to EMEs. It also shows that in 2007, EMEs as a whole were liberalizing, rather than tightening controls on inflows, and that outflow liberalizations were 8 the predominant tool for restricting NKI in the 2007 peak. Only in 2010 did EME stance on inflows policy became a net tightening stance and complemented the NKI reducing stance of outflows policy. 16 There were important differences between countries in terms of the degree of activism on the capital account ( Figure 2 ). India and Thailand were the most active, introducing more than 50 NKI reducing measures over the sample period, whereas Indonesia, Egypt and Morocco the least active in changing capital account policy. There were also differences between countries in terms of the extent to which they relied on tightening of inflow controls or easing of outflow controls as NKI reducing measures. Malaysia, Morocco and Chile relied exclusively on easing of outflows, whereas Indonesia, Peru, Brazil and Colombia used largely inflow tightening measures.
The propensity to change capital outflow controls could be associated with the monetary policy framework and by flexibility of the exchange rate regime of countries (Table 1) . EMEs with inflation targeting (IT) monetary policy and freely floating exchange rates on the whole took fewer measures and changed policy less frequently. The last two columns of Table 1 show that a regime with freely floating exchange rates introduced an average of 0.51 measures per quarter, 16 The figure sums net inflow tightening measures over all EMEs so that net inflow tightening in one country could be cancelled by net inflow easings in another. However, the conclusion that EMEs were liberalizing outflows more than they were tightening inflows remains even if one looks only at NKI reducing measures, i.e. inflow tightenings in all countries and outflows easings in all countries only. As noted above, there were far more outflow easings than inflow tightenings in the sample period. In the subsequent sections, we ask whether the frequency and timing of the net liberalizations of outflows was contingent on fiscal, macroeconomic and financial pressures in the economy in question, focussing in particular on the fiscal revenues that the governments were obtaining from external financial repression.
IV. Measures of Fiscal Concerns
In order to capture the extent to which lost fiscal revenues would constrain the removal of capital outflow controls, we deploy several measures of fiscal concerns. The first and the most direct measure of contribution of outflow controls to fiscal revenues is the revenue from external repression, which we describe in the next sub-section. The other measures of fiscal concerns, 
Easing of Outflows
Tightening of Inflows Total Number of NKI Reducing Measures described in sub-section IV.B below seek to capture the fiscal space of the government as well as the revenue from the use of internal repression that capital outflow controls facilitate.
A. External Repression Revenues in EMEs
The main purpose of capital outflow controls is to keep the domestic cost of borrowing for the government below the rate that would prevail in a fully integrated economy. Therefore, external repression revenue can be defined as the additional cost the government would have to bear to service its domestic debt in the absence of outflow controls. Thus defined, external repression revenue can be measured as the difference between the effective interest rate on the government's foreign borrowing less effective interest rate paid by the government on domestic borrowing, times the repression tax base which is the government's domestic debt (Giovannini and de Melo, 1993) .
The domestic interest rate is computed as:
where interest payments and debt outstanding are measured in local currency units (LCU). 17
The effective external interest rate on government debt has two components: the nominal (US) dollar interest rate on foreign debt and the foreign exchange component (i.e. the increase in dollar interest payments due to depreciation of the domestic currency against the dollar). These components are defined as follows:
Nominal dollar interest rate on external debt
This is computed as the nominal dollar interest payments, including increases in interest arrears, divided by the average outstanding external debt measured in USD. *
/2
The nominal dollar interest rate is computed on non-concessional public and publically guaranteed (PPG) external debt from private creditors. 18
Foreign Exchange (FX) component
The foreign exchange component is computed as the percentage depreciation of average annual exchange rate times the nominal dollar interest rate on external debt and captures the increase in interest payments in dollars due to depreciation of the domestic currency against the USD. * . /
The effective external interest rate is computed as the sum of the above two components.
In principle, there is a third component of effective interest rate on external debt, the "debt revaluation cost". This cost consists of two elements: (a) the change in local currency value of the stock of external dollar denominated debt due to change in the value of local currency against the dollar, and (b) the USD revaluation cost, defined as the increase in dollar value of debt outstanding (repayable) due to appreciation of the dollar against the currencies of denomination of external debt. Debt revaluation cost represents accrued costs and is amortized over the duration of the loan, rather than over the course of a single year. In this paper, our base measure of repression revenues includes only the nominal dollar interest rate and the FX component. While we also compute the debt revaluation cost (and provide summary statistics on the repression revenues including it), we do not include it in our base measure of external repression revenues. The reason is that without knowing the maturity of the debt and the repayment schedule, we would add a very large and volatile component to the repression revenues by including debt revaluation cost. 19 Another key area in which our measure differs from Giovannini and de Melo is that they use only central government external and domestic interest commitments. Due to data constraints, we use public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt for external interest rate, and the broadest level of government for which data is available for domestic interest rate. Since central government debt usually carries the lowest risk premium, the use of interest on PPG debt would tend to inflate our estimates of repression revenues. However, as we will see below, even at these inflated levels, for most EMEs in our sample period, the repression revenues were in fact negative, in contrast to Giovannini and de Melo.
Trends in external repression revenues
The median external repression revenues in the 2000's for 8 of the 15 countries for which we had data, were negative ( Figure 3 ). For another 3 countries, the median revenue as a percentage of GDP was less than 0.5% of GDP. The mean repression revenues for all countries during the 12 2000's were -0.19% of GDP ( Figure 4 ). These represent significant declines from the 1980's, when Giovannini and de Melo estimated the average revenue to be about 1.4% of GDP. 20 6 ). In contrast to the 1980's, the FX component is a small part of effective interest rate differentials for most EMEs. The decline in the external repression revenues therefore reflects both the decline in the external dollar interest rate and the decline in the FX component.
Figure 5: Exchange rate component of external repression revenues is small for most countries
Notes: The plotted values are the means of the variables for the 2000's for each country. Interest Rate differential refers to the percentage difference in external dollar and domestic interest rates. FX component is the percentage exchange rate depreciation against US dollar times the external dollar interest rate. All variables are expressed as percent per annum.
Several factors can explain the decline in the two components of external repression revenues, many of them related to the growth accelerations of EMEs in 2000's (in comparison to 1970-1980s) . The relatively strong growth performance of EMEs vis-à-vis the rest of the world in that period in combination with the easing of monetary policy in the advanced economies led to an overall decline in their external risk premia. Strong domestic demand growth and a shortage of capital in EMEs drove up domestic interest rates and this effect could not fully be counteracted by net capital inflows (given remaining restrictions on these inflows). It also led to a real exchange rate appreciation trend, which contributed to the decline in FX component. There are two other possible reasons for the low estimates of external repression revenues. First, it is possible that in a period of strong EME growth, the external risk premia may have declined too much. History suggests that just as the European periphery debt was overvalued in the years after the launch of the Euro, it may be the case that EME external debt may seem overvalued in the 2000's in posterity. Second, our measure assumes that the external interest rate represents the "market interest rate" for government debt that would prevail in absence of outflow controls. This assumption ignores the fact that several EME governments, particularly India and China, raise a very small share of their total debt (if any) in markets abroad. As a result of the pervasive Interest Diffl.
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% internal financial repression measures, they are able to finance their borrowing needs largely domestically, without pushing up interest rates on their debt and their debt burdens. Therefore, the market interest rate they would face in the absence of external repression could be substantially underestimated by the prevailing external interest rate as the governments' fiscal positions would look less sustainable and risk premium on government debt would be higher in the absence of these restrictions (the demand curves the governments face would be steeper).
Interpretation of negative repression revenues
There are several interpretations of the negative external repression revenues found in our study. Liberalization of outflows by EMEs with negative external repression revenues (other things being equal) could in theory lead to a further increase in their domestic interest rate over the external rate. An EME government concerned about cost of servicing the domestic debt would either not liberalize outflows or do so in tandem with liberalizing inflows or borrow more in markets abroad (liberalizing inflows only for itself). In practice, the fiscal concerns did not prevent outflow liberalizations -EMEs did liberalize outflow policy substantially in the 2000's. However, this was made possible by surging inflows, as most of the liberalizations took place in the years of high NKI (putting downward pressure on domestic interest rates) and rapid economic growth (leading to increasing fiscal revenues from other sources). This suggests fiscal concerns did not pose a binding constraint to outflow liberalization in the 2000's.
A possible interpretation of the negative external repression revenues is that, while many of these EMEs could have borrowed even more in markets abroad in the last decade, they refrained from doing so. That they chose not to borrow more abroad even at favorable interest rates may reflect concerns about greater balance sheet exposure (as most can borrow only in hard currencies) and the fear of a sudden stop. In the event of a sudden stop and the associated sharp exchange rate depreciation, EMEs with larger external debt denominated in foreign currencies would experience a sharper increase in the cost of servicing the debt and more limited external debt refinancing opportunities. The challenges faced by South Korea and Mexico during the 2008-9 crisis would reinforce the concerns about the risks of sudden stops in bad times even in relatively developed EMEs. 21 Finally, emerging markets may be reluctant to open more widely the door to capital outflows to preserve the future repression tax base.
B. Other measures of fiscal concerns in EMEs
Being a measure of external repression, our measure of financial repression does not take into account the revenues that internal financial repression measures (interest rate controls, directed credit, high reserve requirements, etc. that would be ineffective without capital controls) generate for the government. That is to say, our measure of repression does not measure the extent to which the domestic interest rate is below the domestic rate that would prevail in absence of internal repression (and in presence of capital controls). In addition, it does not take into account the seignorage tax revenue, the savings to the government from sterilization and the costs imposed on households that accrue to corporations or banks, rather than to the governments. Recent literature suggests that the size of implicit taxes generated via the banking sector in EMEs can be substantial. According to Lardy (2008) , "The People's Bank of China controls interest rates in a way that has led to significant financial repression-low and now negative real return on deposits-as inflation has risen in recent years. This distorted interest rate structure is a significant obstacle to further reform of the financial system and to sustaining China's rapid economic growth. Financial repression costs Chinese households about 255 billion renminbi (US$36 billion), 4.1 percent of China's GDP, and a fifth of it goes to corporations, one-quarter to banks, and the government assumes the rest."
To capture some of the contribution to fiscal policy of internal repression revenues, we use several measures of fiscal space and of internal repression. These include: 1. Measures of fiscal space: a. Fiscal balance as a share of government tax revenues b. Gross government debt as a share of government tax revenues 2. Measures of fiscal internal repression revenues: a. Liquidation tax (negative of the real interest rate on domestic government debt) b. Real deposit interest rate on domestic government debt c. Banking sector net lending to government as a share of banking sector assets*Inflation. This measure captures the extent to which the government is able to allocate banking savings to itself and tax it through inflation.
Consistent with the decline in external repression revenues, measures of fiscal space and of internal repression revenues in EMEs have also improved over time. Government debt has declined as a percentage of tax revenues and the fiscal balance has improved substantially, potentially allowing the governments room to liberalize outflow controls (Figure 7) . The inflation tax the governments obtained from captive lending to it by the banking sectors has also declined substantially between the 1990's and 2000's ( Figure 8 ). The real deposit interest rate on banking sector deposits has been positive on average during both 1990's and 2000's and governments have been paying positive real interest rates on its domestic debt (implying negative liquidation taxes.
The fact that EME growth was stronger and less volatile in 2000's may have also led to a lesser need for repression revenues. Indeed, the average tax-GDP ratios for EMEs increased by 2 percentage points to 15.2% of GDP in 2000's from the 1990's ( Figure 9 ). 22 
V. Methodology and Data
In this section, we describe the methodology used to assess the relative importance of NKI versus fiscal concerns in determining the capital outflows policy. The main hypotheses is that the larger the fiscal reliance on revenues from repression, the fewer the easings of outflows, and the larger the overheating or exchange rate valuation pressures, the greater the incentive to liberalize. The response to macroeconomic volatility or financial stability concerns arising from NKI could be ambiguous -countries may want to liberalize outflows to build a buffer of foreign investments or to close capital account to insulate them from external shocks. The dependent variable is number of net easings of outflows in a quarter by each country. The main regression equation is:
where are the set of control variables, are the country fixed effects, are the time fixed effects and are the errors. All equations were estimated using OLS, with robust standard errors reported. 23 We tested a number of indicators for each of the hypotheses identified in section II above, i.e. the fiscal, overheating concerns, concerns about macroeconomic stability, 23 Since the number of net easings can be both positive and negative, models like tobit and probit are not appropriate for use with our data. All explanatory variables except the dummy variables are normalized by subtracting the intercountry mean and dividing by the standard deviation, so that the regression coefficients can be interpreted as the impact on net easings of a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variables. To control for potential endogeneity, all the explanatory variables are lagged one quarter. We also drop outliers, which are defined as observations that lie more than 5 standard deviations from the mean of each variable for all explanatory variables. In addition, extreme values of net easings of outflows and number of net tightening of inflows are also considered outliers (outside the range [-8,9] for net easing of outflows and [-8,8] for net tightening of inflows) and excluded from the reported regression results.
Since each of the concerns has several available proxies, we ran the regressions sequentially. In the first set of regressions, each variable for each hypothesis was first tested individually in bivariate regressions and then all variables for the given hypothesis are added as a group in multivariate regression for each hypothesis. From these regressions, all variables that were significant at 20% level of significance or less in any of these regressions were used in the joint test of the hypothesis. In the paper, we only report the results of the first stage for the fiscal concerns and the multivariate regressions. The number of zeros in the left hand side variable is large, as the dataset is quarterly and outflows policy does not change every quarter for most countries. Using OLS on the dataset would tend to produce estimates of coefficients that are biased towards zero and have inflated standard errors. As a robustness check, we also performed the second stage regression after dropping all the zeros -results are consistent with those described in the paper, and are available on request.
VI. Results
The first stage results for the fiscal variables are in Table 2 below. In the full sample of countries none of the fiscal variables are significant at conventional levels of significance suggesting that (in contrast to the 1980's) these variables were not important in the decision to change capital outflow policy. In order to compare the fiscal and the NKI motivations, we report the second stage regressions with both sets of indicators in Table 3 . Due to concerns about correlation between the explanatory variables, particularly those related through the dimensions of the impossible trinity or the trilemma (size of net capital inflows, capital account openness, exchange rate stability and reserves accumulation), we add each of these variables individually first in columns (1)-(7) and then jointly in columns (8)-(11).
We find that among the two hypotheses, most of the significant variables are associated with concerns related to NKI, confirming the use of outflows controls in NKI management policy (Table 3) . Countries liberalized more in response to overheating and appreciation pressures (as evidenced by the sign and significance of variables stock price inflation and exchange market pressure and REER volatility). They liberalized outflows less in the face of financial stability concerns or macroeconomic volatility. The coefficients of short term balance sheet exposure and NKI volatility are negative and significant. In fact, these two variables had the largest coefficients suggesting that they posed an important constraint to the decision to be more open to capital flows. Further, more open EMEs liberalized less frequently than less open EMEs.
Although fiscal balance variable has a positive sign and is significant in some regressions, suggesting that countries with better fiscal positions liberalized more, the measures of internal or external repression revenues are not significant. 25 The results in Table 3 suggest not only that fiscal concerns did not post a binding constraint on the liberalization of outflows, but also that any constraints on this liberalization came from the perceived impact of greater openness on macroeconomic volatility and financial stability.
To test the robustness of our results, we divided the countries into groups according to their degree of capital outflow openness at the beginning of sample period, their exchange rate regime and whether or not they had a monetary policy with an explicit inflation target. Countries with tighter capital outflows controls at the beginning of the sample period would have greater leeway to use outflows policy changes to manage NKI pressures, but may also be more constrained by fiscal concerns if their reliance on repression revenues is greater. In the closed economy subsample, we therefore expect to see fiscal variable play a larger role than in the full sample. Further, as Table 1 showed, non-flexible exchange rate regimes non-IT countries used net outflows easings more frequently than others. Table 4 shows that these countries were also less open on the capital account, had worse fiscal balances and higher repression revenues on average than their counterparts. Therefore, we would expect to see fiscal policy constraints to be stronger in the sub-samples of non-flexible exchange rate and non-IT monetary policy regimes.
We use Schindler's index of outflow restrictions in the year 2000 to group countries into those that had higher than median restrictions to begin with (more closed economies) and those with lower than median restrictions (more open economies). We used IMF AREAER classification to group countries as having freely floating and non-freely floating exchange rates and into countries that had an explicit inflation targeting (IT) monetary policy, and those that did not.
The results for subgroups of countries that were less open, that had a non-flexible exchange rate regime and for countries that had IT and non-IT monetary policy regimes are in Tables 5-8 respectively. 26 The results of the sub-groups are very similar to those for the full sample. The concerns about size and volatility of net capital inflows and the resulting overheating, balance sheet exposures and appreciation pressures are still the most important explanatory variables. Our expectation of a higher importance of fiscal variables in the decision to liberalize outflow controls is confirmed only in the sample of closed economies, and to some extent for non-IT countries. Closed economies were less likely to ease when external repression revenues and inflation tax on bank lending to government were higher. The latter variable is also significant in the sample of non-IT countries. Both IT and non-IT regimes were more likely to ease when fiscal 25 The R-squares in the regressions are not very high and we do not explain more than 17% of the variation in the full sample. Several factors could account for this, the foremost among them being the high frequency of 0's in the sample. There are 121 non-zero net easings of outflows in our sample of 456 observations used in the second to fourth columns of Table 3 . 26 The number of non-zero observations of the dependent variable for country groups open economies, flexible exchange rate regimes was very low -we therefore do not report these results.
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balances are higher. The anomaly is the sign of the liquidation tax variable which suggests that in the samples of closed economies and non-IT regimes, countries with higher liquidation tax liberalized more. However, this may simply reflect the fact that liquidation tax was negative for most countries in our sample. In the non-flexible exchange rate regimes sample, variable related to NKI concerns were the only ones that showed strong associations with liberalizations.
VII. Conclusions and interpretations
This paper documents a steep decline in revenues from external repression in EMEs during the 2000's compared to the earlier decades. Further, our results indicate that most of the significant associations of outflows liberalizations in the 2000's were with concerns related to net capital inflows. Emerging market economies (EMEs) facing high volatility in net capital inflows and higher balance sheet exposures liberalized less. Countries eased more in response to higher net capital inflows, and when these inflows translated into higher appreciation pressure in the exchange market, higher real exchange rate volatility, and greater accumulation of reserves. Unlike the 1980's, we find very limited importance of fiscal variables in explaining liberalization of capital outflow controls -only in the sample of relatively closed and non-inflation targeting countries, do we see a negative association of greater repression revenues with easing of outflows.
The remarkable decline in the fiscal reliance on external repression is good news given that it was accompanied by the deeper tax collection from broader base. However, it begs the question of the future of financial repression. History suggests that one should be cautious in extrapolating from recent trends. The growth acceleration of China and India, and the illusive great moderation prior to the global crisis of 2008-2009 probably contributed to the declining reliance on repression revenues. Yet, a reversal of favorable trends frequently changes attitudes towards financial repression (Reinhart, Kirkegaard and Sbrancia, 2011) . History also suggests that EMEs may rely on financial repression as a contingent tax in the wake of realized bad tail events (as evidenced by the experience of Argentina in the early 2000s). 13 Notes: All regressions include time fixed effects; Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All explanatory variables are lagged one quarter. All variables, except dummies and number of easings/tightenings have been normalized and outliers have been removed. 7 Notes: All regressions include time fixed effects; Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All explanatory variables are lagged one quarter. All variables, except dummies and number of easings/tightenings have been normalized and outliers have been removed. 13  13  13  13  13  13  13  13  13  13  12 12 Notes: All regressions include time fixed effects; Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All explanatory variables are lagged one quarter. All variables, except dummies and number of easings/tightenings have been normalized and outliers have been removed. 10 10 10 10 10 Notes: All regressions include time fixed effects; Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All explanatory variables are lagged one quarter. All variables, except dummies and number of easings/tightenings have been normalized and outliers have been removed. Variables, except interest rates, are in local currency units (LCU) unless otherwise specified.
B. Computation of External Repression Revenues
For quarterly data, the domestic interest is annualized by multiplying the above by 4. In some cases, where the data starts in 2001 or later, the first observation uses gross domestic debt outstanding at t, instead of the average of t and t-1, to avoid losing the observation.
For Argentina, Peru and Turkey, quarterly, non-seasonally adjusted data on interest payments was available, and displayed seasonality. The interest rate computed was smoothed by taking the 4-quarter moving average of i t (including time t). Year-on-year percentage change in CPI. Data is from IFS. Real GDP Growth (% yoy)
Series Name Sources/Definitions
Year-on-year growth of real GDP. Real GDP is from Haver. Current Account Balance/GDP, % 4-quarter moving average of current account/4-quarter moving average of nominal GDP, in percentage terms. Current account data is from IFS and nominal GDP from Haver. NKI/GDP, % Net capital inflows are the financial account balance, n.i.e. (BPM6) series from IFS and are measured in USD. Nominal GDP data is from Haver and in LCU. It is converted into USD by using the period average exchange rate against USD from IFS. since NKI and GDP data are non-seasonally adjusted, 4quarter moving average of NKI is divided by the 4-quarter moving average of GDP (and expressed as percentage) to get NKI/GDP.
NKI surge
Dummy for surge in NKI. Defined according to methodology described in Forbes and Warnock (2012) . 4-quarter moving sum of quarterly NKI are first computed and year-on-year changes in these 4-quarter sums are obtained. Surge episodes satisfy three criteria: (1) current year-over-year changes in four-quarter NKI is more than two standard deviations above the historic (2) the episode is defined as lasting for all consecutive quarters for which the year-over-year change in four-quarter NKI is more than one standard deviation above the historical average; and (3) the length of the episode is greater than one quarter. NKI data are from IFS. FX Valuation Concerns: ∆ (Reserves/GDP, %) (or Change in Reserves/GDP (yoy))
Year-on year change in total reserves excluding gold/annualized nominal GDP. Reserves excluding gold are in SDR, nominal GDP is in local currency units, and is converted into SDR by using end of period exchange rates. All series are from IFS. 
